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Volume 43 Fall 1978 
THE ALLEN INSTRUCTION 
IN CRIMINAL CASES: 
Number 4 
IS THE DYNAMITE CHARGE ABOUT 
TO BE PERMANENTLY DEFUSED?* 
PAUL MARCUS** 
THE PROBLEM 
Let us begin with a none too hypothetical trial situation. The defen-
dant is charged with murder, and after twelve full days of hearing evi-
dence, the jury is finally instructed and directed to consider a verdict.1 
The jurors deliberate and they deliberate still further. They ask for cer-
tain portions of the testimony to be read to them and they retire to the 
jury room once again. Still, after a full day with the case they cannot 
agree. They go home and come back fresh the next morning to begin 
anew. Still they reach no verdict. A third day of discussion comes and no 
verdict is yet before the trial judge. Indeed, the only communication 
from the jurors is a statement by the jury foreman to the effect that the 
jury is having a difficult time reaching a verdict and it might be dead-
locked. 
At this time, should the judge do nothing and simply hope that the 
jury will soon reach a verdict? Or, should the court, on the other hand, 
take some more direct action in the hope of getting the jurors to agree 
to a verdict? Certainly the situation poses a dilemma for the trial judge, 
yet it is one which has existed for centuries. Indeed some scholars trace 
* © 1978 by Paul Marcus 
* * Associate Professor of Law, University of Illinois. A.B. 1968, J.D. 1971, 
University of California Los Angeles. 
1. The fact situation here is taken from People v. Gainer, 19 Cal. 3d. 835, 
566 P.2d 997, 139 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1977). See discussion accompanying notes 
29-35 infra. 
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it as far back as fourteenth century England. 2 In the early days direct 
and forceful action was the guiding light. Load the jurors onto oxcarts 
and have them bounce around until a verdict was reached, 3 or perhaps 
keep the jurors without food or drink until a verdict came forth. 4 Such 
drastic steps soon became unpopular, yet direct action was still taken by 
trial judges. Some ordered that food rations to deadlocked jurors be cut 
back 5 or that the jurors be forced to pay for their own food. 6 Other 
judges preferred somewhat different methods such as not providing 
heat to the jury room during the middle of winter, 7 or simply requiring 
the jury to deliberate all night without offering the jurors the option of 
getting some sleep.8 One trial judge took perhaps the most direct action 
of all; he informed the jurors that if he found any juror to have "stub-
bornly refused to do his duty" he would send that juror to jail for con-
tempt of court.9 
These actions by trial judges clearly produced results, normally a quick 
conference by the jurors and a guilty verdict. Yet, even in the early part 
of the nineteenth century some judges, particularly appeals judges, 
found such practices too forceful and attempts were made to take less 
stringent action which would lead to jury verdicts.10 What developed 
from this troubled history was the supplemental instruction, the direc-
tion to the deadlocked jury to reconsider and perhaps come up with a 
unanimous verdict. The earliest attempt at such an instruction, relied on 
heavily by the United States Supreme Court, was used by a Mas-
sachusetts trial judge and reviewed by the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
2. G. CRABB, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw; OR AN ATTEMPT TO TRACE THE 
RisE, PROGREss, AND SuccESSIVE CHANGES oF THE CoMMON LAw; FROM THE EAR· 
LIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT TIME 287 (1829). For a general discussion of the 
historical dimension of this problem, see Comment, Instructing Deadlocked juries in 
Light of the Trial of Juan Corona, 53 ORE. L. REv. 213 (1974); Comment, Instruct-
ing the Deadlocked Jury: Some Practical Considerations, 8 J. MAR. J. PRAc. & PRoc. 
169 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Practical Considerations]. 
3. State v. Jeffors, 64 Mo. 376, 381 (187'7). 
4. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES * 375; Pope & Jacobs v. State, 36 Miss. 
121 (1858). 
5. Fairbanks, Morse, & Co. v. Weeber, 15 Colo. App. 268, 62 P. 368 (1900). 
6. Henderson v. Reynolds, 84 Ga. 159, 10 S.E. 734 (1889). 
7. Mead v. City of Richland Center, 237 Wis. 537, 297 N.W. 419 (1941). 
8. Commonwealth v. Moore, 398 Pa. 198, 157 A.2d 65 (1959). Justice Mus-
manno filed a vigorous dissent. Nevertheless, the conviction for voluntary man-
slaughter was affirmed, despite the action of the trial court. 
9. Liveley v. Sexton, 35 Ill. App. 417 (1890). 
10. Such techniques are not relegated to a place in ancient history as very 
vigorous efforts have been utilized by trial judges even in recent years. See, e.g., 
United States v. Parks, 411 F.2d 1171, 1173 (1st Cir. 1969), where the jury delib-
erated from one in the afternoon until one in the morning. The jurors informed 
the judge that they were tired and were deadlocked yet the judge did not allow 
them to go home. Predictably, a guilty verdict was returned less than two hours 
later. 
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in the case of Commonwealth v. Tuey. 11 The instruction was reviewed 
favorably by the higher court and soon began to spread throughout the 
nation. Why was it so popular? There are two reasons for its rapid popu-
larity as well as for the United States Supreme Court's quick validation 
of the supplemental instruction. First, it was not as harsh as earlier 
methods. Second, and more importantly, it worked. Deadlocked juries, 
after hearing the instruction, returned verdicts.12 It worked so well, in 
fact, that lawyers began to describe it-probably accurately-as the 
"third-degree instruction," 13 the "shotgun instruction," 14 the "nitro-
glycerin charge," 15 the "dynamite charge," 16 the "hammer instruc-
tion," 17 and finally, the "hanging instruction." 18 Of course, its most 
popular name is, simply, the Allen instruction. 
THE ALLEN INSTRUCTION 
While there is no single or uniform supplemental jury instruction to 
deal with the problem of the deadlocked jury 19 in criminal cases, 20 most 
such instructions trace their roots, at least, back to the famous 1896 Su-
preme Court decision in Allen v. United States. 21 The decision is an odd 
one, odd certainly in the fact that Allen was not represented by counsel 
and no brief was presented on his behalf, and odd also in the fact that 
for such a major trial dilemma 22 so little consideration was given to the 
issue by the Court. 23 Of the eighteen assigned errors in the case, the 
11. 62 Mass. 1 (1851). 
12. "The charge is used precisely because it works, because it can blast ·a 
verdict out of a jury otherwise unable to agree that a person is guilty." United 
States v. Bailey, 468 F.2d 652, 666 (5th Cir. 1972). But see Comment, Practical 
Cons_iderations, supra note 2, at 185. 
13. Comment, ABA jury Instructions Adopted as Preferable to Allen Charge, 25 
VAND. L. REv. 246 n.2 (1972). 
14. Id. 
15. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STAN-
DARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY jURY 151 (1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA STAN-
DARDS]. 
16. People v. Gainer, 19 Cal. 3d 835, 836, 566 P.2d 997, 1000, 139 Cal. Rptr. 
861, 864 (1977). 
17. State v. Cook, 512 S.W.2d 907 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974). 
18. Levine v. Headlee, 148 W.Va. 323, 134 S.E.2d 892 (1964). 
19. "There is not merely one Allen charge, but an infinite number of varia-
tions of the charge, in current use." ABA STANDARDS, supra note 15, at 155. 
20. Because of the different considerations present in civil actions, only the 
criminal trial problem will be addressed here. No doubt, however, the problem is 
present in civil cases as well. See People v. Gainer, 19 Cal. 3d 835, 566 P.2d 997, 
139 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1977). 
21. 164 u.s. 492 (1896). 
22. Cf Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735, 741 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. 
denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966) (Coleman,]., specially concurring). 
23. The case had twice been before the Court previously because of errone-
ous instructions. 150 U.S. 551 (1893) and 157 U.S. 675 (1895). The third time 
around the supplemental instruction discussion took barely one page of space. 
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last two raised the problem for discussion here. As the Supreme Court 
indicated, after the jury began its deliberations it came back into the 
court room and received additional instructions. The Court paraphrased 
the instructions as follows: 
These instructions were quite lengthy and were, in substance, 
that in a large proportion of cases absolpte certainty could not 
be expected; that although the verdict must be the verdict of 
each individual juror, and not a mere acquiescence in the con-
clusion of his fellows, yet they should examine the question 
submitted with candor and· with a proper regard and deference 
to the opinions of each other; that is was their duty to decide 
the case if they could conscientiously do so; that they should 
listen, with a disposition to be convinced, to each other's argu-
ments; that, if much the larger number were for conviction, a 
dissenting juror should consider whether his doubt was a 
reasonable one which made no impression upon the minds of 
so many men, equally honest, equally intelligent with himself. 
If, upon the other hand, the majority was for acquittal, the 
minority ought to ask themselves whether they might not 
reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment which was not 
concurred in by the majority.24 
While it could be argued that such an instruction was unduly coercive, 
particularly in its direction only to dissenting jurors, 25 the Court took 
little time before strongly supporting the instruction. 
While, undoubtedly, the verdict of the jury should represent 
the opinion of each individual juror, it by no means follows that 
opinions may not be changed by conference in the jury room. 
The very object of the jury system is to secure unanimity by a 
comparison of views, and by arguments among the jurors 
themselves. It certainly cannot be the law that each juror should 
not listen with deference to the arguments and with a distrust 
of his own judgment, if he finds a large majority of the jury 
taking a different view of the case from what he does himself. 
It cannot be that each juror should go to the jury room with a 
blind determination that the verdict shall represent his opinion 
of the case at that moment; or, that he should close his ears to 
the arguments of men who are equally honest and intelligent as 
himself.26 
Considering the broad problems with deadlocked juries and the need for 
a uniform strategy for dealing with the problems, the Court's virtually 
summary affirmance of the instruction is surprising. Not nearly as sur-
prising, however, as the Court's refusal to consider ever again the merits 
24. 164 U.S. at 501. The Court said that the instruction was taken from 
Commonwealth v. Tuey, 62 Mass. 1 (1851). 
25. See text accompanying notes 70-83, infra. 
26. 164 U.S. at 501. 
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of the instruction. 27 The Fifth Circuit noted this well. "That it should 
have become the foundationstone of all modern law regarding dead-
locked juries is perhaps the greatest anomaly of the Allen case." 28 
But Allen did swiftly capture the hearts and minds of trial judges 
across the country and an Allen, or Allen-type, instruction began to be 
used in most jurisdictions as a matter of course. This state of affairs 
proceeded apace for approximately half a century. Then, beginning in 
the early 1950's, criticism of the Allen charge surfaced and became in-
creasingly palatable to appellate judges. As we shall see, several states 
and federal circuits have expressly rejected Allen. At this juncture, 
though, it would be well to look at the attacks on Allen, and there have 
been none as direct and well-considered as that by the California Su-
preme Court in the latter part of 1977. 
CRITICS OF THE DYNAMITE CHARGE 
Making reference to an "Allen instruction" or "Allen-type instruction" is 
a risky proposition.29 Many trial judges begin with the basic formula-
tion as presented in Allen but move on to give the jury further state-
ments. Such a situation confronted the California court in People v. 
Gainer. 30 The trial court there gave the "basic" Allen instruction to the 
jury after the jury reported it was deadlocked. In addition to this basic 
instruction, however, the jury was informed that "the case must at some 
time be decided" and that "there is no reason to suppose the case will 
ever be submitted to twelve men or women more intelligent, more im-
partial or more competent to decide it .... " 31 The court, thus, was 
called upon to evaluate the traditional, basic Allen charge as well as the 
embellishments added by the trial court in the actual case. 
"Collateral" Attacks on the Instruction 
Before exploring the two major arguments which the Gainer court 
utilized in striking down the Allen charge and the modified instruction, it 
should be noted that far more than two arguments have been used for 
decades in questioning the propriety of such a supplemental instruction. 
Preliminarily, the fact that there is no single Allen instruction 32 itself 
serves as an important argument against the rule. 33 The language dif-
27. See text accompanying notes 124-31, infra. 
28. United States v. Bailey, 468 F.2d 652, 666 (5th Cir. 1972). 
29. See note 19, supra. 
30. 19 Cal.3d 835, 566 P.2d 997, 139 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1977). 
31. Id. at 841, 566 P.2d at 999, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 863. 
32. "Second, the Allen charge has resulted in a multitude of variations which 
have in turn bred and proliferated appellate review." State v. Martin, 297 Minn. 
359, 365, 211 N.W.2d 765, 769 (1973). 
33. "Each new paraphrase of the charge brings up its own questions of pro-
priety, and courts have differed widely in their tolerance for added or substi-
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fers from case to case, and the reliance on any one particular element is 
fleeting at best. In banning the use of such supplemental instructions, 
the Arizona Supreme Court perhaps stated the complaint best: 
It now appears that its continued use will result in an endless 
chain of designs, each link thereof tempered and forged with 
varying facts and circumstances and welded with the ever-
changing personalities of the appellate court. This is not in 
keeping with sound justice .... We are convinced that the evils 
far outweigh the benefits, and decree that its use shall no 
longer be tolerated and approved by this court.34 
Moreover, the attempt to use different language to assuage the critics of 
Allen has sometimes led to almost comical results. Consider the statement 
of the Louisiana Supreme Court: 
In the course of giving its instruction, the trial court ad-
monished the jurors that if a majority favor conviction, the 
minority should consider whether their doubts are reasonable, 
since they make no effective impression upon the minds of 
"* * * so many equally honest~ equally intelligent fellow jurors. 
* * *" Likewise, the court instructed that if a majority or a lesser 
number favor acquittal, the other jurors should ask themselves 
whether they do not have reason to doubt the correctness of a 
judgment not concurred in "* * * by many of their fellow 
jurors.* * *" (Emphasis here and elsewhere supplied.) .... 
[S]uch a charge virtually insures jury confusion; it urges those 
favoring conviction or acquittal to discount their views if they 
are in the minority or in a bare majority. Thus, the instruction is 
clearly an attempt to avoid the coercive effect of admonition of 
only the minority and to achieve a balanced charge. Such a 
charge is so difficult to comprehend that ... it is "* * * an in-
vitation to a frolic with Alice in Wonderland." 35 
Many other problems have arisen in connection with the use of a sup-
plemental instruction generally. For instance, as discussed in Gainer, 
there is the problem of defense objections to the Allen instruction. In 
many situations the defense counsel may be unable to object prior to the 
giving of the instruction; has he waived his claim by such inactivity? The 
Gainer court said no.36 There is also the continuing question of the 
tuted language." Comment, Deadlocked Juries and Dynamite: A Critical Looll at the 
"Allen Charge," 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 386, 391 (1964). 
34. State v. Thomas, 86 Ariz. 161, 166, 342 P.2d 197, 200 (1959). See gener-
ally Comment, Criminal Procedure-Jury Instructions-ABA Standard Adopted for In-
structing Deadlocked Juries, 42 TENN. L. REv. 803 (1975). 
35. State v. Nicholson, 315 So.2d 639, 642 (La. 1975). 
36. Clearly defendants cannot be required to anticipate supplemental 
instructions a judge might give, upon pain of inviting error. Nor 
was the defense counsel required to interrupt the judge's charge at 
every controversial phrase, thereby courting the animosity of the 
jury and implying that the charge hurt his client's case. Indeed 
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judge gtvmg the supplemental instruction after he has found out the 
numerical division of the deadlocked jury. While it is well established 
that the judge may not make inquiry of the jury to find out the division 
of its members after an apparent deadlock, 37 in many cases such infor-
mation is volunteered by the jury. Is it error then to give the supplemen-
tal instruction? Some judges say no, so long as the information was in 
fact voluntarily given. 38 Others, such as Judge Sobeloff, take a different 
view. He has argued that such a practice is error, as "the implications of 
Brasfield would seem to apply equally whether the information was pro-
moted by the judge's inquiry or was thrust upon him. The pressure on 
the minority jurors is the same in both instances." 39 This reasoning was 
adopted by then Judge Warren Burger in Mullin v. United States. 40 The 
trial court there had declared a mistrial after the jury informed the 
court that it was deadlocked and further informed the court that the 
split was seven guilty, four not guilty and one undecided. The Chief 
Justice agreed that the declaration of mistrial was proper because "[i]t 
would have been a precarious undertaking for the Judge to give a sup-
plemental charge to consider each other's views when he was already 
advised that only 4 of I2 jurors voted for acquittal." 41 
Quite apart from the general propriety of giving the instruction after 
receiving the information concerning division, there is the question of 
the judge doing so once he hears there are very few minority jurors. 
Although allowing continued use of the Allen charge in other cir-
cumstances, one court did reverse a conviction in which the supplemen-. 
tal instruction was given after the trial judge inadvertantly learned that 
the jury stood II to I for conviction, 42 while another court in the same 
situation affirmed a conviction.43 Perhaps the answer is to instruct the 
jury very early in the trial never to reveal how its votes are progressing. 
This was the remedy suggested by the Chief Justice in Mullin: 
While it is probably rare for jurors to reveal the standing of 
their vote to anyone before verdict or deadlock is found we 
commend to the District Court a fixed practice of admonishing 
every jury at the time it retires that it must not reveal the stand-
common courtesy, and respect for the dignity of judicial proceed-
ings, caution against interruption of a judge who is advising the 
jury. 
19 Cal.3d at 842 n.2, 566 P.2d at 1000 n.2, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 864 n.2. 
37. Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448 (1926). 
38. United States v. Williams, 444 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. 
Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335 (4th Cir. 1970). 
39. United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335, 1348 (dissenting opinion). 
40. 356 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
41. Id. at 370. 
42. People v. Baumgartner, 166 Cal. App.2d 103, 332 P.2d 366 (1958). See 
discussion in People v. Gainer, 19 Cal.3d at 845, 566 P.2d at 1002, 139 Cal. Rptr. 
at 866. 
43. United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1977). 
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ing of its vote at any time to anyone, including the Trial Judge, 
but to report only a verdict or inability to reach one. 44 
A more recent problem has now surfaced to make life even more dif-
ficult for appeals judges, the giving of the supplemental instruction 
more than once. Some courts have allowed the giving of the instruction 
more than once when the jury requested it.45 In United States v. Sea-
well46 the far more difficult question was put at issue. After deliberating 
for some hours in connection with an apparently difficult armed robbery 
case, the jury informed the judge that it was "at a ten-to-two impasse." 47 
The judge gave the supplemental instruction and the jury retired again. 
Three and one-half hours later the jury again informed the judge of the 
impasse. The judge reread the instruction and less than one hour later a 
guilty verdict was returned. While continuing to uphold Allen, 48 the 
court concluded that the circumstances here dictated reversal. 
Ordinarily, the general test of whether a supplemental jury 
instruction is in error is to consider all the circumstances to de-
termine if the instruction was coercive. Pragmatic considera-
tions weigh against the application of this test when an Allen 
charge is given more than once. A case-by-case determination 
would provide little, if any, guidance for a trial judge. Defen-
dants would also face insurmountable difficulties in attempting 
to show prejudice. A single Allen charge, without more, stands 
at the brink of impermissible coercion. We believe that the pro-
tection of a defendant's right to an impartial jury compels a per 
se. rule. Such a rule is not at odds with prior decisions of this 
court or other courts of appeals. We conclude that as a sound 
rule of practice it is reversible error to repeat an Allen charge in 
a federal prosecution in this circuit after a jury has reported 
itself deadlocked and has not itself requested a repetition of the 
instruction. 49 
44. 356 F.2d at 370. 
45. White v. United States, 279 F.2d 740, 750 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 
850 (1960). 
46. 550 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1977). 
47. Id. at 1160. 
48. Problems arising from the inherently coercive effect of the Allen 
charge have caused other courts of appeals and state courts to pro-
hibit or to restrict severely its use. Nevertheless, the content, timing 
and circumstances surrounding the Allen charges given here have 
been upheld by this circuit and we do not undertake to reexamine 
those decisions. 
Id. at 1162. 
49. Id. at 1163. The court went on to note, in footnote 8: 
A per se rule, such as the one we have adopted here, always poses 
the risk that it may sweep within its embrace cases which do not 
warrant its protection. We believe, however, that this "cost" of 
adopting a per se rule is outweighed by the importance of a defen-
dant's right to an impartial jury trial and the insurmountable prob-
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The timing of the Allen charge raises a related and complex question: 
Before the judge can give the instruction does the jury have to inform 
him that it is "hopelessly deadlocked"? The usual rule is no, it is in the 
trial judge's discretion as to the timing. 5° Still, faced with an uncertain 
situation some courts are willing to focus on both the time element and 
the nature of the communications from the jury. See, for instance, 
United States v. Contreras, 51 where the trial judge gave the instruction on 
the jury's second day of deliberations, but before there was any indica-
tion that the jury was deadlocked. The court reversed the conviction 
finding that the instruction had a coercive impact on the jury. 
Within the circumstances of this case, the Allen charge was 
premature. We have a profound feeling that it was coercive 
upon the jury. The Allen instruction "certainly should be given 
only when it is apparent to the district judge from the jury's 
conduct or the length of its deliberations that it is clearly war-
ranted." Here, although the jury had deliberated for nearly 
eight hours, there was no indication that it was deadlocked. In 
seeking clarification of the judge's instructions, the jury did not 
indicate that it was having trouble reaching a unanimous ver-
dict.52 
In connection with the timing of the instruction, two additional points 
should be made. First, regardless of the rule in any single case, "there is 
no uniformity among courts as to the length of time which must elapse 
after the jury retires before the charge is appropriate." 53 Of more con-
cern is the second point, as expressed in 1962 by Judge Brown in voting 
to invalidate the Allen charge. 
What is worse, it is becoming more and more commonplace. 
Nearly every hard-fought criminal case coming to this Court 
reveals the Judge s9oner or later giving this charge or some 
embellishment of it. Too often, as in these two cases, it was but 
a matter of a few hours after the jury had retired to deliberate. 
And not infrequently, as we were led to believe on oral argu-
ment in both of these cases, it occurs with the last jury in the 
last case at that Division point for that particular term. To the 
other pressures which are irrelevant is the other and natural 
one of a personal consideration for the Judge who, like jurors, 
also wants to go home. The charge pointedly reminds them 
that to hold out disrupts the plans of all.54 
lems of proof and appellate review that a less definite rule would 
occasion. 
Compare with United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1977). 
50. People v. Newby, 66 Mich. App. 400, 239 N.W.2d 387 (1976). 
51. 463 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1972). 
52. Id. at 774. 
53. State v. Martin, 297 Minn. 359, 366, 211 N.W.2d 765, 769 (1973). 
54. Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 759 (5th Cir.) (dissenting opin-
ion), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 955 (1962). ABA STANDARDS, supra note 15, at 147-48. 
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The final collateral question relates to the practical value in having an 
Allen or Allen-type supplemental instruction. Considering the relatively 
small number of cases which ever progress to the felony jury trial dead-
lock, 55 and the seriousness that most jurors attach to their assign-
ments, 56 substantial doubt must be raised as to the real need for the 
supplemental instruction. Moreover, even assuming that there are some 
true savings at the trial level in time and cost with the supplemental 
instruction, doubtless those savings are more than balanced by the costs 
at the appeals level. Numerous courts and commentators have lamented 
the time and energy spent by appeals courts on the Allen instruction 
generally-along with timing problems, harmless error questions :; 7 and 
other issues-and some have even concluded that "any judicial expense 
saved at the trial level is resurrected at the appellate level." 58 To be 
sure. when the Arizona Supreme Court finally had enough of the 
numerous Allen issue appeals one of the main reasons cited for the in-
validation of the instruction was the time and effort wasted because of it. 
This instruction has been before us four times. When and 
wherever its use is called into question it must stand or fall 
upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case. It has 
given, and we believe each use will give us, harassment and dis-
tress in the administration of justice. No rule of thumb can cir-
cumscribe definite bounds of when and where, or under what 
circumstances it should be given or refused. 
It now appears that its continued use will result in an endless 
chain of decisions, each link thereof tempered and forged with 
varying facts and circumstances and welded with everchanging 
personalities of the appellate court. This is not in keeping with 
sound justice and the preservation of human liberties and sec-
Other time limit problems have been created as well. See, e.g., Goff v. United 
States, 446 F.2d 623 (lOth Cir. 1971), where thejudge informed the jury that he 
would give them one more hour of deliberation or he would declare a mistrial. 
The court on appeal held this to be error. "It was impermissibly suggestive and 
coercive for the Court to place a time fuse on the period of deliberation. Such 
constitutes reversible error." !d. at 626. 
55. See Comment, Practical Considerations, supra note 2, at 170. 
56. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 15, at 151-52: 
While some say that the Allen charge is only intended to induce jurors 
to join in conscientious collective deliberation in an honest effort to 
reach a verdict, there is not evidence that any significant number of 
American jurors fail to approach their task in this manner (citations 
omitted). Indeed, what evidence is available on why juries fail to agree 
indicates that it is not the result of one or two stubborn jurors, but 
rather the result of a truly substantial division on the first ballot. 
57. See People v. Gainer, 19 Cal.3d at 854, 566 P.2d at 1007, 139 Cal. Rptr. 
at 871. 
58. Comment, ABA Jury Instructions Adopted as Preferable to Allen Charge, 25 
VAND. L. REv. 246, 251 (1972). See also Comment, An Argument for the Abandon-
ment of the Allen Charge in California, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 939, 946 (1975). 
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urity. We are convinced that the evils far outweigh the benefits, 
and decree that its use shall no longer be tolerated and ap-
proved by this court. 59 
A Misstatement of the Law 
623 
The above arguments could truly be utilized to mount a devastating 
attack against Allen and its progeny. In a sense they may demonstrate 
that Allen created far more difficult problems than it solved. Neverthe-
less, these arguments are only collateral to the three major attacks which 
have been made against the supplemental instruction: First, that the in-
struction does not correctly state the law. Second, that the charge unduly 
coerces the minority of jurors. And, third, the instruction as given IS 
unconstitutional. 
In Redeford v. State 60 the trial judge instructed the jury as follows: 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you are now into your sec-
ond day of deliberation. I don't have to tell you that, you're 
well aware of it. You've heard all the evidence in this case for 
approximately two and half [sic] to three days. Really, there is 
nothing decided unless the jury comes in with a verdict. You're an 
intelligent jury, and if this case had to be tried over because of 
your failure to reach a verdict, another jury of twelve people no 
more intelligent would hear the same evidence and attempt to 
reach a verdict. So you don't accomplish anything by not reaching a 
verdict in this case. So would you continue your deliberations, 
please, and put your collective minds together, and reach a verdict in 
this case. 61 
While perhaps cruder in tone than most, this sort of statement has for 
decades been attached to the usual Allen instruction. 62 In essence, the 
jury is instructed, either explicitly or implicitly, that "the case must at 
some time be decided." 63 And such a direction is wrong. The court in 
·Gainer properly stated that-aside from the coercive impact of such a 
statement 64 -"such statements are legally inaccurate. It is simply not 
true that a criminal case 'must at some time be decided.' " 65 The re-
59. State v. Thomas, 86 Ariz. 161, 166, 342 P.2d 197, 200 (1959). See also 
note 132 and accompanying text, infra. 
60. 572 P.2d 219 (1977). 
61. /d. at 220 (emphasis in original). The Nevada Supreme Court reversed 
the conviction, finding that such an instruction might have forced the jury to 
reach a compromise verdict. 
62. See generally State v. Martin, 297 Minn. 359, 211 N.W.2d 765 (1973); 
Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 955 
(1962). 
63. People v. Gainer, 19 Cal.3d at 851, 566 P.2d at 1006, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 
870. 
64. See discussion in text accompanying notes 70-83 infra. 
65. 19 Cal.3d at 852, 566 P.2d at 1006, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 870. 
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quirement of a verdict has never been a part of the law, 66 and for good 
reason. As the Third Circuit so aptly showed, in a jury trial there always 
have been and will continue to be three possible decisions of the jury: 
not guilty, guilty, and no verdict due to lack of unanimity.67 All three 
options are open to the jury, and it is not in the province of the judge to 
indicate that either of two of these options is better or more accurate 
than the third.68 Judge Brown stated the principle behind this rule ef-
fectively: 
I think a mistrial from a hung jury is a safeguard to liberty. 
In many areas it is the sole means by which one or a few may 
stand out against an overwhelming contemporary public senti-
ment. Nothing should interfere with its exercise. In the final 
analysis the Allen charge itself does not make sense. All it may 
rightfully say is that there is a duty to consider the views of 
others but that a conscientious person has finally the right and 
duty to stand by conscience. If it says that and nothing more it 
is a superfluous lecture in citizenship. If it says more to declare 
that there is a duty to decide, it is legally incorrect as an inter-
ference with that rightful independence. 
The time has come, I think, to forbid this practice. Like the 
silver platter, this is too dear to keep. The cost in fundamental 
fairness is too great. 69 
Because the inclusion of the "this case must be decided" language is er-
roneous and may well be weighed heavily by the jury, the Gainer court 
was clearly correct in striking down this portion of the instruction. 
Coercion of the Minority Jurors 
Suppose we do not have to be concerned with collateral matters such 
as timing, or a charge directed too clearly to a known, small minority of 
jurors, and so forth. Suppose also that the judge has not told the jury 
that the case must at some time be decided. Suppose, therefore, we have 
66. State v. Martin, 297 Minn. 359, 365, 211 N.W.2d 765, 769 (1973). See also 
Comment, An Argument for the Abandonment of the Allen Charge in California, 15 
SANTA CLARA LAW. 939, 948 (1975). 
67. United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 416 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 
u.s. 837 (1969). 
68. See Comment, The Allen Charge Dilemma, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 637, 652, 
663 (1972). 
69. Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 759 (5th Cir.) (dissenting opin-
ion), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 955 (1962). In their classic study of the jury system, 
Kalven and Zeisel stated much the same rationale: 
The hung jury is, in a way, the jury system's most interesting 
phenomenon. In one sense it marks a failure of the system, since it 
necessarily brings a declaration of mistrial in its wake. In another 
sense, it is a valued assurance of integrity, since it can serve to protect 
the dissent of a minority. 
H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN juRY 453 (1966). 
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the original Allen instruction. Is this instruction invalid? Yes, said the 
court in Gainer, for aside from all else it unfairly coerces the minority of 
jurors to reach a verdict in accordance with the majority. The Court 
raised two primary objections to the instruction that 
a dissenting juror should consider whether a doubt in his or 
her own mind is a reasonable one, which makes no impression 
on the minds of so many men or women equally honest, equally 
intelligent with himself or herself. ... 70 
The first objection is that with the instruction the jurors are told not 
to be concerned, exclusively, with the evidence presented against the ac-
cused. Instead, they must also consider the nature of the deliberations in 
determining guilt or innocence. 
The one or more "holdout" jurors are told that in reaching 
their independent conclusions as to whether or not a reasonable 
doubt of the defendant's guilt exists, they are to weigh not only 
the arguments and evidence but also their own status as 
dissenters-a consideration both rationally and legally irrele-
vant to the issue of guilt. They are thus deflected from their 
proper role as triers of fact, as effectively as if they had been 
instructed to consider their doubts as to guilt in light of their 
own prejudices or desire to go home. 71 
Wholly apart from the constitutional claims which can be raised in con-
nection with such a procedure, 72 the inclusion of such thinking on the 
juror's part is error. In essence, the minority jurors-whichever way the 
jurors are voting- 73 are instructed to assume that they are wrong, that 
the majority jurors are right, and that they should reconsider their views 
accordingly.74 When the instruction is broken down in this fashion, the 
direction to the jury approaches a shocking change of the basic jury 
function in our system. To prevail, the state must, beyond a reasonable 
70. People v. Gainer, 19 Cal.3d at 848, 566 P.2d at 1004, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 
868. 
71. Id. 
72. See discussion at text accompanying notes 85-104 infra. 
73. As the Gainer court forcefully wrote, the error is not eliminated if the 
majority is preliminarily voting for acquittal: 
Nor need we speculate that in the majority of cases the giving of an 
Allen instruction will aid the prosecution rather than the defense: an 
even distribution of risk between prosecution and defense over a mul-
titude of cases is not the measure of justice. Our jury system aspires to 
produce fair and accurate factual determinations in each case. An im-
proper instruction should not be tolereated simply because statistically 
it may help defendants as much as prosecutors. Whichever adversary it 
favors, in urging minority jurors to reconsider their votes the Allen 
charge places excessive and illegitimate pressures on the deliberating 
jury. For this reason the giving of the charge is error. 
19 Cal. 3d at 851, 566 P.2d at 1006, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 870. 
74. United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 416 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 
u.s. 837 (1969). 
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doubt, prove guilt to the satisfaction of each individual juror on the evi-
dence and the evidence alone.75 With this instruction, that requirement 
is substantially defeated. 
The second objection is no less serious. The Gainer court noted that 
regardless of the extraneous evidence to be considered the trial court 
was simply exerting overwhelming and unfair pressure on the dissenting 
jurors. 
The dissenters, struggling to maintain their position in a pro-
tracted debate in the jury room, are led into the courtroom 
and, before their peers, specifically requested by the judge to 
reconsider their position. No similar request is made of the 
majority. It matters little that the judge does not know the iden-
tity of the particular dissenters; their fellow jurors know, and 
the danger immediately arises that "the Allen charge can com-
pound the inevitable pressure to agree felt by minority jurors." 
The charge "'places the sanction of the court behind the views 
of the majority, whatever they may be, and tempts the minority 
juror to relinquish his position simply because he has been the 
subject of a particular instruction."' 76 
There can be little question that the instruction works, the dissenters are 
quickly disposed to change their votes and to join the majority. 77 Justice 
Udall set out the inevitable view almost thirty years ago: 
The majority think he is guilty; the Court thinks I ought to 
agree with the majority so the Court must think he is guilty. 
While the Court did tell me not to surrender my conscientious 
convictions, he told me to doubt seriously the correctness of my 
own judgment. The Court was talking directly to me, since I 
am the one who is keeping everyone from going home. So I 
will just have to change my vote.78 
Few persons would challenge the contention that the Allen charge 
greatly influences the minority jurors. Hence, it has been suggested that 
the way to eliminate the problem is to influence both the minority -and 
75. See People v. Superior Court, 67 Cal.2d 929, 434 P.2d 623, 64 Cal. Rptr. 
327 (1967). 
76. People v. Gainer, 19 Cal.3d at 850, 566 P.2d at 1005, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 
869 (citations omitted). 
77. /d.; State v. Martin, 297 Minn. 359, 211 N.W.2d 765 (1973); ABA STAN-
DARDS, supra note 15, at 147; Comment, An Argument For the Abandonment of the 
Allen Charge in California, 15 SANTA CLARA LAw. 939, 943 (1975); Comment, The 
Allen Charge: Dead Law a Long Time Dying, 6 U.S.F. L. REv. 326, 329 (1972); 
Comment, Deadlocked juries and Dynamite: A Critical Look at the Allen Charge, 31 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 386, 389-90 (1964). For a general discussion of the impact of in-
structions on juries and the manner in which jurors decide cases, as seen in the 
experimental jury project at the law school of the University of Chicago, see 
James, Status and Competence of jurors, 64 AM. J. Soc. 563 (1959). 
78. State v. Voeckall, 69 Ariz. 145, 157, 210 P.2d 972, 980 (1949) (dissenting 
opinion). See also State v. Randall, 137 Mont. 534, 353 P.2d 1054 (1960). 
1978] ALLEN INSTRUCTIONS 627 
the majority jurors. 79 Such a suggestion has not been broadly adopted 
and for good reason. As the court in Gainer showed, any reference to a 
majority or minority faction on the jury is irrelevant to the issue of guilt, 
so on that ground alone it would be erroneous. 80 It would also be 
ludicrous as shown by the Third Circuit in United States v. Fioravanti. 81 
To avoid the coercion of the minority the instruction would have to be 
the bizarre sort of charge the court imagined in Fioravanti. 
A Juror should listen with deference to his fellow jurors and 
with distrust of his own judgment if he finds that a large major-
ity of jurors take a different view from that which he or she 
takes. Similarly, in such circumstances, one in the majority 
should distrust his own judgment if he finds a minority of 
jurors taking a different view from that which he or she takes. 82 
Such an instruction no doubt merely advises all sides in the jury to be 
good citizens, behave themselves and listen to others. If it does only that 
it is of no value at all. If it does more than that (i.e. if it succeeds in 
instructing both the majority and the minority to listen to each other and 
to distrust their own judgment because both sides are probably wrong!) it 
"would be an invitation to a frolic with Alice in Wonderland." 83 
Constitutional Arguments 
Despite the problems with the Allen charge and the many rejections of 
it,84 most courts in turning away from Allen have done so on other than 
constitutional grounds. In some cases the courts merely say such an in-
struction was error and give no ground for the decision. 85 In other 
cases, such as Gainer, the court expressly refuses to use constitutional 
arguments and instead decides that Allen should be rejected "as a judi-
cially declared rule of criminal procedure."86 Lest there by any doubt, 
however, strong constitutional arguments against Allen can be and have 
been marshalled. 
Basically, the constitutional arguments center around the due process 
requirements inherent in any criminal trial and the way in which Allen 
abridges those requirements. The threshold point to be made here is 
that the due process clause-either by itself or with support of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel and right to trial-requires that a trial be 
conducted fairly. 
79. See State v. Martin, 297 Minn. 359, 365, 211 N.W. 2d 765, 769 (1973). 
80. People v. Gainer, 19 Cal.3d 835, 850 n.12, 566 P.2d 997, 1005 n.12, 139 
Cal Rptr. 861, 869 n.12. 
81. 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969). 
82. Jd. at 417. 
83. Jd. 
84. See note I 05 infra. 
85. See, e.g., State v. Martin, 297 Minn. 359, 2ll N.W.2d 765 (1973). 
86. 19 Cal.3d at 852, 566 P.2d at 1006, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 870. 
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In essence, the right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally 
accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, "indifferent" jurors. 
The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even 
the minimal standards of due process.87 
As Mr. Justice Black stated so succinctly, "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is 
a basic requirement of due process." 88 The arguments that the Allen 
charge violates due process boil down to four contentions: (1) it defeats 
the unanimity rule, (2) it does violence to the "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" standard, (3) the jury does not remain impartial, and (4) the jury 
is instructed to consider matters extraneous to the guilt or innocence of 
the accused in addition to the evidence offered at trial in making its 
determination. 
1. The Unanimity Requirement 
The federal courts, and most state courts, require that a jury verdict 
be unanimous.89 And this requirement has been deemed essential to 
the fair trial proceeding. 
The requirement of a unanimous jury verdict for criminal 
cases in the federal courts and in all but a handful of states is 
eloquent testimonial that something more than a majority vote 
is desired. In this respect the jury system is unique. No other 
deliberative body in the world requires unanimity-be it the 
Congress of the United States, the College of Cardinals, the 
Boards of Directors of our great corporations, this court of ap-
peals, or the United States Supreme Court. The proponents of 
the jury system maintain that a greater degree of accuracy is 
guaranteed from this process of give and take which is invari-
ably essential to reaching unanimity.90 
When the jurors, particularly dissenting jurors, are required to rethink 
their position, some real. question is raised as to whether the effective 
Allen charge somehow dilutes the unanimity requirement. Because it dis-
courages jurors from freely holding their views the ultimate verqict may 
not truly be unanimous; dissenters may join the m~ority to avoid the 
wrath of the trial judge. The Third Circuit in United States v. Fioravanti 
stated the concern quite well: 
The jury persists as the finder of fact because it is designed 
to be a deliberative body, charged with the responsibility of ex-
changing ideas, and with the concomitant practices of arguing 
87. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). 
88. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137 (1955). The Court expressed the 
same view in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966): "Due process re-
quires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside 
influences." 
89. See generally United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 417-18 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969). 
90. Id. at 418. 
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and influencing. A judicial barrier should not be erected in the 
jury room to discourage free and open discussion. 
If the validity of the unanimous jury verdict requirement is 
to persevere, appropriate respect must be extended and due 
protection afforded to the incidence of group interaction for 
this is the only justification for a verdict requiring a quantum of 
agreement in excess of a simple majority.91 
2. Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Standard 
629 
Related to the unanimity requirement is the standard of proof in crim-
inal cases: the state must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The unanimity of a verdict in a criminal case is inextricably 
interwoven with the required measure of proof. To sustain the 
validity of a verdict by less than all of the jurors is to destroy 
this test of proof for there cannot be a verdict supported by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt if one or more jurors remain 
reasonably in doubt as to guilt. 92 
One must question whether the standard has been met in the Allen 
context. The jury reports a fairly clear deadlock of, say, nine to three 
after deliberating three days. The Allen instruction is given; after two 
hours of deliberation a unanimous verdict of guilty is reported back. 
Could anyone in this situation-a not uncommon one-say with any 
degree of certainty that somehow in that two-hour period each and 
every juror became convinced of the guilt of the defendant, and con-
vinced beyond a reasonable doubt? It strains credibility to believe that 
such a miraculous transformation has taken place in such a short time. 
The more likely explanation is that the dissenters were worn out and felt 
an obligation to reach a verdict in light of the trial judge's comments. 
This hardly constitutes unanimity in reaching a verdict beyond a reason-
able doubt. 
We are convinced that the traditional measure of proof in 
criminal cases envisions a "subjective standard"-viz, each indi-
vidual juror must be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt. To maintain that an objective standard 
governs could nullify the constitutionally mandated require-
ment of unanimity of verdict. Under any standard other than 
an individual juror's determination, would not "the doubt of a 
91. Id. at 417. 
92. Hibdon v. United States, 204 F.2d 834, 838 (6th Cir. 1953). See also Bil-
led v. United States, 184 F.2d 394, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1950): 
An accused is presumed to be innocent. Guilt must be established 
beyond a reasonable doubt. All twelve jurors must be convinced 
beyond that doubt; if only one of them fixedly has a reasonable doubt, 
a verdict of guilty cannot be returned. 
See generally United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 418-19 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969). 
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single juror in the face of seven votes for conviction [be] * * * 
per se unreasonable?" 
Where a verdict of guilty is generated by the process of being 
influenced by a preliminary vote of the majority instead of sub-
jective convincement beyond a reasonable doubt, at best we 
have a situation where two separate portions of the charge are 
at loggerheads; at worst, we have a serious question that the 
charge may have become constitutionally delinquent, in deroga-
tion of the defendant's tranditional right of trial by jury.03 
3. An Impartial jury 
Due process requires that the defendant's trial be heard by an impar-
tial jury.94 Can the jury truly remain impartial when it is directed by 
the court to reconsider the entire matter because some minority jurors 
cannot side with the majority? That, truly, is the question. The answer is 
no. Such direction by the judge does indeed bias the jury to return a 
verdict. Those jurors are no longer impartial. Judge Coleman explained 
the situation with great clarity in his oft-cited opinion in Thaggard v. 
United States. 95 
There is no intention of criticizing the District Judge for 
using this instruction. It is being done all the time, and it seems 
to the writer from considerable trial experience that the prac-
tice is growing instead of diminishing. It likewise seems from 
practical experience that after a jury has retired to consider its 
verdict, has done so for some time, and has indicated that it is 
in hopeless deadlock, every juror, not being trained in the law, 
understands from the Allen charge that what the Judge wants 
93. United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d at 419. See also State v. Martin, 297 
Minn. 359, 365-66, 211 N'.W.2d 765, 769 (1973): 
[B]y admonishing that absolute certainty cannot be attained or ex-
pected, the Allen Charge tends to erode the universal rule requiring 
guilt to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
One commentator stated the objection quite well. 
The imposition of outside evidence also plays havoc with the concept 
of "reasonable doubt." If unanimity is to have any meaning beyond the 
theoretical, each juror must be convinced of an accused's guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Tentative opinions or balance of the jury members 
should play no role in a dissenting juror's change of position. There is 
no connection between the majority view and the reasonableness of an 
individual juror's doubt. Yet, the charge may have the effect of lower-
ing the standard of proof from the necessary concurring views of 12 
individuals to what the majority considers sufficient. The state would 
then not have proved its case beyond the reasonable doubt and the 
defendant would be denied a fair trial. 
Comment, The Allen Charge: Dead Law a Long Time Dying, 6 U.S.F. L. REV. 326, 
334 (1972). 
94. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966). 
95. 354 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966). 
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is a verdict. So, there the previously reluctant juror stands, fan-
cying himself in opposition to the wishes of a United States 
Judge, which is about the last position in which he ever wanted 
to find himself. He is only exercising everyday human nature 
when he gets out of that unhappy predicament just as quickly 
as he can. 
The real burden of what I am saying is that the essential 
meaning of Constitutionally guaranteed trial by jury is that 
once the jury has retired to consider of its verdict it should not 
be subjected to so much as the appearance of any influence 
from any source for the purpose of producing a verdict. The 
jurors should be left to the unhampered expression of their 
own consciences, independently arrived at.96 
631 
If the judge who gives the Allen charge gives the indication that he might 
be exerting undue pressure on members of the jury, at least the strong 
appearance of partiality has been created. Such a situation violates the 
right to a fair trial by jury. 
4. Factors Extraneous to the Issue of Guilt 
Perhaps the strongest constitutional argument to be offered against 
the Allen charge, and one relied on heavily by the Gainer court, is that 
the instruction directs the jurors to consider factors extraneous and ir-
relevant to the issue of guilt, and in addition to the items of evidence 
which were properly admitted at trial. 
Yet in instructing that "a dissenting juror should consider 
whether a doubt in his or her own mind is a reasonable one, 
which makes no impression on the minds of so many men or 
women equally honest, equally intelligent. with himself or her-
self," the trial judge pointedly directs the jurors to include an 
extraneous factor in their deliberations, i.e., the position of the majority 
of jurors at the moment. The one or more "holdout" jurors are 
told that in reaching their independent conclusions as to 
whether or not a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt 
exists, they are to weigh not only the arguments and evidence 
but also their own status as dissenters-a consideration both ra-
tionally and legally irrelevant to the issue of guilt. They are thus de-
flected from their proper role as triers of fact, as effectively as if they 
had been instructed to consider their doubts as to guilt in light 
of their own prejudices or desire to go home. 97 
Without question the California court's analysis is correct. Indeed, that 
result is precisely the point of the supplemental instruction. The judge 
wants the dissenting jurors to reconsider their views in light of the fact 
that most of the other jurors do not share such a view. The hope, of 
96. /d. at 741. 
97. 19 Cal.3d at 848, 566 P.2d at 1004, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 868 (emphasis 
added). 
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course, is that the dissenting view will be shifted so that the majority 
verdict will soon become the unanimous verdict. 
This result cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. Time and time 
again the Supreme Court has said that the jury "verdict must be based 
upon the evidence developed at the trial." 98 "The requirement that a 
jury's verdict 'must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial' 
goes to the fundamental integrity of all that is embraced in the constitu-
tional concept of trial by jury." 99 Quite clearly the Allen instruction does 
not comport with either the letter or the spirit of this principle. The jury 
is instructed in no uncertain terms to consider not only the evidence but 
the manner in which the deliberations are taking place and the status of 
minority jurors vis-a-vis majority jurors. Such a practice is unconstitu-
tionaJ.l00 
The constitutional arguments against Allen can be substantial, yet most 
courts generally avoid constitutional determinations in this area. Some 
courts raise the constitutional issue, but then decide the cases on other 
grounds.101 Other courts discuss the substantive problems but do not 
identify them as constitutional questions. 102 Perhaps the courts are 
loathe to consider the constitutional grounds when the Supreme Court, 
despite numerous opportunities, has chosen not to invalidate Allen. 103 
More likely, courts act this way so as to follow the general rule that cases 
ought to be decided on non-constitutional grounds if at all possible.104 
Whatever the reason, despite the few constitutional holdings, courts and 
attorneys should not ignore the fact that substantial constitutional ques-
tions arise whenever the supplemental instruction is given. 
98. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). 
99. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472 (1964). The Court went further: 
In the constitutional sense, trial by jury in a criminal case necessarily 
implies at the very least that the "evidence developed" against a defen-
dant shall come from the witness stand in a public courtroom where 
there is full judicial protection of the defendant's right of confronta-
tion, of cross-examination, and of counsel. 
/d. at 472-73. 
100. For a good discussion on this point see Comment, Due Process, judicial 
Economy and the Hung jury: A Re-examination of the Allen Charge, 53 VA. L. REV. 
123 (1967). 
101. See, e.g., People v. Gainer, 19 Cal.3d 835, 566 P.2d 997, 139 Cal. Rptr. 
861 (1977); United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 
(1969). See generally ABA STANDARDS, supra note 15, at 149. 
102. See People v. Gainer, 19 Cal. 3d 835, 566 P.2d 997, 139 Cal. Rptr. 861 
(1977). 
I 03. A very real possibility; see text accompanying notes 124-131 infra. 
104. Cf United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 
(1969). 
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THE ALLEN SuPPORTERS 
Most courts considering a substantive appeal of the issue appear skep-
tical as to the continued validity of Allen and either refuse to follow it or 
limit it considerably.105 The Fifth Circuit was frank in its evaluation: 
"The Allen charge both deserves and receives a healthy disrespect in our 
courts." 106 The courts recognize the logical and practical problems with 
Allen and do not wish to invite reversal by its continued use. As the 
Louisiana Supreme Court remarked, 'jurisprudential and scholarly dis-
approval appears to approach universality." 107 While there is a definite 
trend to eliminate or cut back on Allen 108 many states and .federal juris-
dictions 109 still retain both the traditional Allen charge as well as the em-
bellished supplemental instructions.11° 
In light of the intense criticism, one might legitimately ask why the 
instruction remains viable in so many jurisdictions.U 1 If Allen is dying, 
why after so many years is there still a pulse? Four answers can be given 
to this puzzling question. First, in many states few substantive cases ever 
seem to reach the higher appellate courts. For instance, in states the size 
of Texas and New York, very rarely have appellate judges been specifi-
cally directed to consider the validity of the Allen charge.112 Another 
answer to the question is that in many jurisdictions when the Allen ques-
tion has arisen the court's attention was focused on collateral matters 
which disposed of the case. See, for example, United States v. Seawell 113 
105. For a comprehensive list of these cases see Comment, The Allen Charge: 
The Propriety of Giving Supplemental Instructions to a Deadlocked Jury, 22 LoY. L. 
REv. 667, 673-75 (1976). See also Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 1154; Annot., 100 
A.L.R.2d 177. 
106. United States v. Amaya, 509 F.2d 8, 12 (5th Cir.' 1975), aff'd after new 
trial, 533 F.2d 188 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1101 (1977). Neverthe-
less, the Allen charge is still good law in the Fifth Circuit. 
107. State v. Nicholson, 315 So. 2d 639, 643 (La. 1975). 
108. "It is clear, however, that the 'dynamite charge' is being defused." Com-
ment, The Allen Charge: Recurring Problems and Recent Developments, 47 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 296, 319 (1972); Comment, On Instructing Deadlocked Juries, 78 YALE L.J. 
100, 103 (1968) ("Hostility to the Allen charge has been growing for some 
. , ) time.... . . 
109. Indeed, the dissenter in Nicholson noted that Allen was still the "over-
whelming weight of authority in the United States." 315 So.2d at 646. 
110. See generally People v. Gainer; 19 Cal. 3d 835, 566 P.2d 997, 139 Cal. 
Rptr. 861 (1977). 
111. To be sure, the basic Allen instruction was given as a part of the manual 
on jury instructions in federal criminal cases, 33 F.R.D. 523, 611 (1963), from 
1963 until 1969. See discussion in United States v. Silvern, 484 F.2d 879 (7th 
Cir. 1973). See also Devitt and Blackmar, 1 FEDERAL JuRY PRACTICE AND IN-
STRUCTIONS § 18.14 (1977). 
112. See, e.g., Arrevalo v. Texas, 489 S.W.2d 569 (1973); People v. Abdul 
Karim Al-Kanani, 33 N.Y.2d 260, 307 N.E.2d 43, 351 N.Y.S.2d 969 (1973), cert. 
denied, .417 U.S. 916 (1974). 
113. 550 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1977). See also United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d 
374 (lOth Cir. 1975). 
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where the Ninth Circuit had its attention directed to the repeating of the 
supplemental instruction rather than to the propriety of any particular 
supplemental instruction. 
The most obvious (and perhaps most important) reason some courts 
have not rejected Allen is that these courts simply do not agree with the 
prevailing criticism. As the dissenting justice remarked in the Gainer 
case, "The 'Allen instruction' is an 'appropriate action to encourage 
agreement.'" 114 As another judge pointed out, "The importance of hav-
ing a jury agree may properly be urged upon their attention .... They 
may properly be warned against stubbornness and self-assertion.'' 115 The 
most direct attack on the criticism of Allen was made by the Fourth Cir-
cuit in United States v. Sawyers. 116 Recognizing the "increasing criticism 
of Allen type charges," 117 the court dealt with the attacks in some de-
tail. The court specifically stated that the assertion "that anyone has the 
right to hang a jury rather than the right to a true verdict is errone-
ous." 118 The court remarked that the key determination was whether 
the jury had been coerced into reaching a verdict. If the jury has not 
been coerced, the defendant cannot complain. 
When a defendant occasionally benefits, if he does, from a 
hung jury, he is getting not what he is entitled to have but 
something less. Beneath the criticism of verdict inducing in-
structions is the apparent assumption that such an instruction is 
always detrimental to defendants. We are unaware of any statis-
tical survey proving or disproving such an assumption. We do 
know, however, that not infrequently verdicts of acquittal follow 
Allen type instructions. So far as we know, there is no reason to 
suppose that an Allen type instruction is more likely to induce a 
verdict of guilty than of not guilty. Indeed, the trial judge may 
not inquire as to how the jury stands, and thus may not know-
ingly press for a verdict either way except in the rare instance 
when the jurors disclose to him, without inquiry, their divi-
sion.119 
Similar remarks were made by Judge Pell, dissenting from the Seventh 
Circuit's adoption of a set rule regarding supplemental instructions.J2° 
In addition, though, he contended that appeals judges should not affir-
matively direct the giving of jury instructions. They should, perhaps, 
114.-19 Cal.3d at 859, 566 P.2d at 1011, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 875. See also People 
v. Carter, 68 Cal.2d 810, 815, 442 P.2d 353, 356, 69 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300 (1968). 
115. People v. Randall, 9 N.Y.2d 413,425, 174 N.E.2d 507, 515, 214 N.Y.S.2d 
417, 427 (1961). See also United States v. Sutherland, 463 F.2d 641 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1078 (1972). 
116. 423 F.2d 1335 (4th Cir. 1970). 
117. Id. at 1340. 
118. Id. at 1341. 
119. Id. 
120. United States v. Silvern, 484 F.2d 879, 884 (7th Cir. 1973). 
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impose guidelines, but they should not set out the instructions which 
would or would not be suitable. 
My basic feeling is that the matter of writing instructions 
should remain in the hands of the trial judges. They are the 
ones at the battle site who are best in the position to judge 
which instructions are appropriate to the factual issues. 
Likewise they are best in the position to determine the nature, 
necessity, and verbiage of instructions to be given in connection 
with the functional aspects of jury deliberation, including those 
that may be necessary when it reasonably appears that a jury 
has reached the status of being deadlocked. If in any instruc-
tion the court misstates the law and the effect is prejudicial 
then, of course, a reversal would ordinarily follow. By prescrib-
ing the exact language in which a trial judge may instruct in the 
deadlocked situation we are, it seems to me, substantially cir-
cumscribing the discretionary flexibility needed by the trial 
judge for effective trial administration. It is one thing to find 
no error in an instruction which has been given in a trial, 
thereby putting out tacit approval on it, and an entirely differ-
ent matter to engage in a priori processes of word fixation.121 
A final reason should be given as to why some federal courts are re-
luctant to cast aside Allen even when there is substantial skepticism as to 
the validity of the instruction. The Supreme Court has only once addres-
sed the issue of the Allen instruction, in Allen, and it expressly upheld 
the constitutionality of the instruction. Then Judge John Paul Stevens, 
sitting on the Seventh Circuit, expressed the obvious concern quite 
clearly. 
I have not yet been able satisfactorily to explain to myself 
how this circuit can lawfully announce that an instruction to a 
jury which the Supreme Court has specifically and squarely 
held is not reversible error in federal criminal trials shall in the 
future constitute reversible error when given in such trials con-
ducted in the Seventh Circuit.122 
Although a few responses have been given to this concern, they may 
not be, as Justice Stevens wrote, "completely satisfactory." 123 First, it is 
argued that the Court last considered Allen in the 19th century when 
concerns over criminal defendants' rights were minimal.124 While this 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 886. 
123. Id. See also United States v. Skillman, 442 F.2d 542 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
404 u.s. 833 (1971). 
124. I realize that as long as Allen ... stands it is our duty to follow it. I 
entertain the thought that if it were submitted to the Supreme 
Court today the result might not be the same as it was in 1896. I 
cannot see that the qualifications, reservations, and escape clauses 
customarily used in modern versions of the charge save it from 
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fact is no doubt true, it is not at all clear that the Court would indeed 
hold to the contrary today. It has had the opportunity to do so in 
numerous cases in which review has been denied by the Court. It has 
also chosen not to consider the issue when it was raised in cases disposed 
of on other grounds by the Court.125 A related response is that aside 
from the binding effect of the earlier Allen decision, any charge which 
today coerces a jury verdict denies due process; usually jenkins v. United 
States 126 is cited for this proposition. It is true that the Court there held 
that a particular supplemental instruction was unduly coercive. The 
problem is that the Court specifically noted that it was coercive "in its 
context and under all the circumstances," 127 and that the circumstances 
were especially egregious. After only two hours of deliberation the jury 
informed the judge that it could not reach a verdict "on both counts 
because of insufficient evidence." Instead of simply giving a supplemen-
tal instruction of the standard form, 128 the trial judge told the jury, 
"You have got to reach a decision in this case." 129 This is hardly a clear 
precedent for the broad due process claims in opposition to Allen. 
Perhaps the best reason why the lower federal courts should be able to 
reject Allen-in spite of the Supreme Court's refusal to overrule it-is 
the most deceptively simple one. The Court held that it was not uncon-
stitutional to give the Allen instruction. It did not say it was a required 
instruction, or that alternative instructions were not also valid. Thus, 
without reaching the constitutional claims regarding Allen, 130 courts 
should be able to use their own supervisory power to say that other 
methods of dealing with the problem of the deadlocked juries are pref-
erable. Of course, even this limited rationale is troublesome when the 
courts (as the Seventh Circuit) declare that continued use of Allen will 
being what it is, and what the jury believes it to be, a direct appeal 
from the Bench for a verdict. 
Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735, 739-40 (5th Cir. 1965) (Coleman, J., 
specially concurring), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 985 (1966). 
125. See, e.g., Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952), where the Court 
held that numerous errors "are either insubstantial or so adequately disposed of 
by the court of appeals that we give them no notice .... "Id. at 744. At the court 
of appeals level, 190 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1951), a challenge to Allen was raised on 
broad grounds and was rejected. The Allen problem was again raised in appel-
lant's brief before the Supreme Court, Opening Brief on Behalf of Appellant at 
160-69. See Comment, The Allen Charge Dilemma, 10 AM. CRlM. L. REv. 637, 664 
n.I09 (1972). 
126. 380 U.S. 445 (1965). See discussion in Comment, The Allen Charge: The 
Propriety of Giving Supplemental Instructions to a Deadlocked jury, 22 LoY. L. REV. 
667, 669 (1976). 
127. 380 U.S. at 446. 
128. Or declaring a mistrial because of the jury's reference to "insufficient 
evidence." 
129. 380 U.S. at 446. 
130. None of the federal courts do, at least not in their holdings. 
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constitute reversible error. Still, the continued emphasis here should be 
on the discretionary powers of the courts rather than on any formal 
constitutional determinations by those courts.131 
SoLUTIONS To THE PROBLEM 
The theoretical and logical objections to Allen are substantial. The 
major practical objection, though, would seem to be that the giving of 
the Allen instruction as written wastes the time of so many appellate 
judges (albeit saving the time of some trial judges}.132 Thus, one is 
131. The question of being bound by stare decisis regarding the Allen rule is 
present even with circuit decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 468 F.2d 
652, 669 (5th Cir. 1972) (citations omitted): 
We deeply regret being compelled to affirm this conviction. We do so 
only because we are bound by precedent. Were the choice ours alone 
to make, we would put an end to the Allen charge in a "quick and not 
too decent burial." It is our fervent hope that when appellant petitions 
this court for rehearing en bane our learned and distinguished breth-
ren will vote for en bane consideration. We would also hope that this 
court will join the jurisdictions that have abolished this abuseable relic. 
But whatever the outcome of such a hearing, the law cannot help but 
be vastly improved by our issuing a definitive statement regarding the 
further use of the dynamite charge. · 
The court, en bane, reaffirmed its support for Allen. United States v. Bailey, 480 
F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1973). 
132. In the 5th Circuit, where an Allen charge is not improper-United States 
v. Thomas, 567 F.2d 638, 643 (5th Cir. 1978)-the courts have recently been 
swamped with literally dozens of Allen instruction questions in both civil and 
criminal cases. See, e.g., United States v. Solomon, 565 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1978); 
United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Skinner, 
535 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1976), eert. denied, 429 U.S. 1048 (1977); United States v. 
Taylor, 530 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1976); Government of the Canal Zone v. Fears, 
528 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Cheramie, 520 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 
1975); Brooks v. Bay State Abrasive Products, Inc., 516 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1090 (1976); United States v. Howell, 514 F.2d 710 
(5th Cir.), eert. denied, 423 U.S. 914 (1975); Bryan v. Wainwright, 511 F.2d 644 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975); United States v. Amaya, 509 F.2d 8 
(5th Cir. 1975), aff'd after new trial, 533 F.2d 188 (5th Cir. 1976), eert. denied, 429 
U.S. 1101 (1977); United States v. Fonseca, 490 F.2d 464 (5th Cir.), eert. denied, 
419 U.S. 1072 (1974); United States v. Thaxton, 483 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973); 
United States v. Bailey, 480 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bailey, 468 
F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Sutherland, 463 F.2d 641 (5th Cir.), 
eert. denied, 409 U.S. 1078 (1972); United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 894 (5th 
Cir. 1971); Hale v. United States, 435 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1970), eert. denied, 402 
U.S. 976 (1971); Nordmann v. National Hotel Company, 425 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 
1970); Downs v. American Employers Insurance Company, 423 F.2d 1160 (5th 
Cir. 1970); United States v. Hill, 417 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1969); Posey v. United 
States, 416 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1969), eert. denied, 397 U.S. 946 (1970); Pennington 
v. United States, 392 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971); 
Williamson v. United States, 365 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966); Cunningham v. United 
States, 356 F.2d 454 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 952 (1966); Thaggard v. 
United States, 354 F.2d 735 (5th Cir.), eert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966); North 
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drawn to the difficult question: Is there a solution to this dilemma? The 
obvious solution, of course, is simply to avoid using Allen and not give 
any supplemental instruction at all to the jury.133 Few persons have 
seriously suggested this solution for an all-too-clear reason. When the 
jury is deadlocked some guidance is needed to assist them in reaching a 
verdict if reasonably possible. The Illinois Supreme Court expressed the 
view nicely: "[W]e do not feel that a jury should be left to grope in such 
circumstances without some guidance from the court." 134 
Other suggestions have also been made. One commentator thought 
that incorporating the Allen charge into the initial voir dire would enable 
selection of jurors to "be based on a potential juror's capacity to with-
stand the intimidation inherent in the Allen charge." 135 The problem 
with any such proposal, as recognized even by the commentator suggest-
ing it, is that it is somewhat naive. "[A] real possibility exists that during 
voir dire a juror will establish his capacity to resist the coercion of an 
Allen charge and later accede to majority rule under the pressures of 
the instruction." 136 Moreover, the type of juror who could completely 
say that he would definitely not be influenced by the majority's position 
on a matter may not be the open-minded sort of juror either the pro-
secution or defense would want. 
While other suggestions have been made for eliminating the supple-
mental instructions and using other devices to assist the deadlocked 
jury, 137 few of these suggestions are taken very seriously. Most judges 
and commentators would prefer to utilize some sort of supplemental in-
Texas Producers Association v. Metzger Dairies, Inc., 348 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 977 (1966); Walker v. United States, 342 F.2d 22 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 859 (1965); Estes v. United States, 335 F.2d 609 (5th 
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965); Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852 
(5th Cir. 1962); Andrews v. United States, 309 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1962), cerl. 
denied, 372 U.S. 946 (1963); Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 370 U.S. 955 (1962); Powell v. United States, 297 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 
1961); Sikes v. United States, 279 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1960); Silverman v. Travel-
ers Insurance Company, 277 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1960); Wilson v. Southern Farm 
Bureau Casualty Company, 275 F.2d 819 (5th Cir.), cerl. denied, 364 U.S. 817 
(1960); Slade v. United States, 267 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1959); Harrell v. United 
States, 220 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1955); Burton v. United States, 175 F.2d 960 (5th 
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 909 (1950). 
133. See Comment, Criminal Procedure-Jury Instructions-ADA Standard 
Adopted for Instructing Deadlocked juries, 42 TENN. L. REv. 803, 814 (1975). 
134. People v. Prim, 53 Ill.2d 62, 74, 289 N.E.2d 601, 608 (1972), cert. denied, 
412 U.S. 918. See also United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335, 1343 (4th Cir. 
1970). But see People v. Sullivan, 392 Mich. 324, 220 N.W.2d 441 (1974) (dissent-
ing opinion). 
135. Comment, The Allen Charge: Recurring Problems and Recent Developments, 47 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 296, 317 (1972). 
136. Id. at 318. 
137. For a creative group of suggestions, see Comment, Instructing Deadlociled 
juries in Light of the Trial of Juan Corona, 53 ORE. L. REv. 213, 223-25 (1974). 
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struction, while avoiding if possible the kinds of difficulties which Allen 
creates. One alternative for toning down the harshness of Allen is to 
allow the use.of the supplemental instruction only if it was given earlier 
as part of the large block of jury instructions.138 Another would be to 
require, in addition to the Allen instruction, a re-reading to the dead-
locked jury of the instructions regarding the presumption of innocence 
and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.139 
The ABA Approach 
Most courts, faced with the prospect of dealing with deadlocked juries, 
have not in recent years retained the Allen charge, nor have they 
adopted the possible proposals discussed above. Instead, a single pro-
posal formulated by a section of the American Bar Association has swept 
the nation, resulting in strong praise by commentators.140 More im por-
tantly, it has been widely adopted (either as a requirement or a strong 
suggestion to trial judges) by both federaJ1 41 and state courts.142 In 
1968 the American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for 
Criminal Justice reported its Standards Relating to Trial by Jury. Stan-
138. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 502 at 349 (1969). This is 
the approach apparently taken by the Seventh Circuit. United States v. Silvern, 
484 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1973). 
139. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 502 at 349 (1969). 
140. See, e.g., the following comments praising the ABA proposal: Cushioning 
the Blow of the "Dynamite Charge," 6 MEMPHIS ST . .L. REv. 553 (1976); Comment, 
An Argument for the Abandonment of the Allen Charge in California, 15 SANTA CLARA 
LAw. 939 (1975); Criminal Procedure-Jury Instructions-A.B.A. Standard Adopted 
for Instructing Deadlocked juries, 42 TENN. L. REV. 803 (1975); Comment, Instruct-
ing Deadlocked juries: The Present Status of the Allen Charge, 3 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 
313 (1972); Comment, The Faltering Allen Charge and its Proposed Replacement, 16 
ST. Loms L.J. 619 (1972); The Allen Charge Dilemma, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 637 
(1972); The Allen Charge: Recurring Problems and Recent Developments, 47 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 296 (1972); The Allen Charge: Dead Law a Long Time Dying, 6 U.S.F. L. REv. 
326 (1972). 
141. For a very limited sample of the federal cases, see these recent cases: 
United States v. Silvern, 484 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Flannery, 
451 F.2d 880 (1st Cir. 1971); United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 
1971); United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v. 
Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969). The Commit-
tee on the Operation of the Jury System of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States Courts has recommended that the ABA standards, with one addi-
tion, be supported. See discussion in United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335, 
1342 n.7 (4th Cir. 1970). 
142. For a small sample of the state cases, see People v. Gainer, 19 Cal.3d 835, 
857, 566 P.2d 997, 1009, 139 Cal. Rptr. 861, 873; State v. Nicholson, 315 So. 2d 
639 (La. 1975); People v. Sullivan, 392 Mich. 324, 220 N.W.2d 441 (1974); State 
v. Martin, 297 Minn. 359, 211 N.W.2d 765 (1973); People v. Prim, 53 Ill. 2d 62, 
289 N.E.2d 601 (1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918 (1973); Commonwealth v. 
Spencer, 442 Pa. 328, 275 A.2d 299 (1971). 
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dard 5.4 was designed specifically to deal with the Allen charge ques-
tions. The standard provides as follows: 
(a) Before the jury retires for deliberation, the court may give 
an instruction which informs the jury: 
(i) that in order to return a verdict, each juror must 
agree thereto; 
(ii) that jurors have a duty to consult with one another 
and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agree-
ment, if it can be done without violence to individual 
judgment; 
(iii) that each juror must decide the case for himself, 
but only after an impartial consideration of the evi-
dence with his fellow jurors; 
(iv) that in the cours·e of deliberations, a juror should 
not hesitate to reexamine his own views and change 
his opinion if convinced it is erroneous; and 
(v) that no juror should surrender his honest convic-
tion as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely 
because of the opinion of his fellow jurors, or for the 
mere purpose of returning a verdict. 
(b) If it appears to the court that the jury has been unable to 
agree, the court may require the jury to continue their delibera-
tions and may give or repeat an instruction as provided in sub-
section (a). The court shall not require or threaten to require 
the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or for 
unreasonable intervals. 
(c) The jury may be discharged without having agreed upon a 
verdict if it appears that there is no reasonable probability of 
agreement.143 
Why is the ABA standard superior to the usual supplemental instruc-
tion, at least in the minds of the many judges who have adopted it? First, 
the instruction is given at the conclusion of the trial before any delibera-
tions have been started by the jury. This is a great advantage, as the jury 
143. In the comments to the standards the drafters also set forth an example 
of an instruction which would be consistent with the standards: 
The verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror. 
In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that each juror agree 
thereto. Your verdict must be unanimous. 
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliber-
ate with a view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without 
violence to individual judgment. Each of you must decide the case for 
yourself, but do so only after an impartial consideration of the evi-
dence with your fellow jurors. In the course of your deliberations, do 
not hesitate to re-examine your own views and change your opinion if 
convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest conviction 
as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of 
your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. 
You are not partisans. You are judges-judges of the facts. Your 
sole interest is to ascertain the truth from the evidence in the case. 
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is advised at the start how to proceed if there is a split, and the reread-
ing of the instruction later would not be nearly as coercive on the minor-
ity jurors as it is in the typical Allen situation. Reference should also be 
made to the obvious fact that there is no mention at all in the standard 
of majority-minority splits, the jurors are simply advised as to their obli-
gations and rights as jurors. Also, rather than directing the jury to de-
cide the case, the jury is instead told to consult with each other and to 
reach agreement "if it can be done without violence to individual judg-
ment." In short, by informing the jurors of these responsibilities and 
rights, and by not telling them that the case must be decided, the judge 
is simply stressing the importance of their endeavor, yet avoiding virtu-
ally all the problems created by Allen. It is an instruction which can be 
given again when the jury is deadlocked. The jury is made to under-
stand in no uncertain terms that it should try its hardest to reach a ver-
dict. Thus, it may well work; as with Allen it may have the effect of 
eliminating petty differences. Still, it does not coerce, it does not 
threaten, it does not improperly state the law. It is a correct declaration 
of legal principles, it may work effectively, and it does not unfairly push 
the jury. As most judges to review it have realized, there is little more 
that can be asked of any one instruction.144 
CONCLUSION 
The California Supreme Court in the Gainer case was right: The Allen 
charge is coercive, unfair to defendants, an inaccurate statement of the 
law, and might well be unconstitutional if the Supreme Court ever 
chooses to reconsider the matter. Nevertheless, deadlocked juries are a 
fact of life which cannot be swept aside. Something is needed to assist 
the deadlocked jury. The jurors may be at loose ends during delibera-
tions, but often they could be persuaded in a legitimate fashion to reach 
a verdict. What is needed is the instruction based upon the ABA stan-
dard. This standard will have the effect of aiding the jury in an 
evenhanded and lawful way. In addition to the growing legion of courts 
to adopt it, other courts, including the United States Supreme Court, 
should take a fresh and favorable look at the ABA standard. The time 
has come for the dynamite charge to be permanently defused. 
144. For an excellent, and favorable, analysis of the ABA Standards, see State 
v. Martin, 297 Minn. 359, 211 N.W.2d 765 (1973). 
